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SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF PAROLE1
Carter H. White2
I. INTRODUCTION
With public attention directed to the
administrative side of the parole system
in our criminal jurisprudence,3 too
little heed has been paid the legalistic
side of parole and the direction, if any,
that the law is taking in that regard.
It is the purpose of this paper to indi-
cate some of the legal problems neces-
sarily or unnecessarily involved in the
use of parole as a peno-correctional
device and the treatment thereof by the
courts.4
Of necessity, this paper will be con-
fined to parole as that word is strictly
construed in the criminal law, omitting
absolute pardon, conditional pardon,
commutation, reprieve, probation, and
indeterminate sentence, except where
they are necessary to the explanation
of the problem. Likewise many isolated
problems related to parole will be dis-
regarded or only incidentally men-
tioned; 5 emphasis being placed on four
or five main divisions.
The defects in a paper of this kind
are several:
1. Data are necessarily limited to
reported appellate court cases, which
means the omission of many points that
were never appealed for lack of money,
connections, or an intelligent lawyer.
' Prepared under the direction of Professor
Sheldon Glueck of the Harvard Law School.
2 Harvard University Law School, Cambridge,
Mass.
3 Recent publicity on the investigation into the
Mass. parole racket.
4 A similar, though less intensive, work was
done for probation by Professor Sam B. Warner,
"Some Legal Problems Raised by Probation," in
Probation and Criminal Justice, edited by Pro-
2. The courts often confuse parole
with probation or conditional pardon,
thus obfuscating the issues..
3. Many cases deal only with the
interpretation of various sections of a
particular parole statute, with no enun-
ciation of basic principles of parole.
Similar statutes may be construed dif-
ferently in different states.
4. Some of these problems of statu-
tory interpretation are being solved or
more obscured at each court session,
but new problems are raised in their
stead by' legislative, amendment.'
Notwithstanding these obvious de-
fects, and probably others, this paper
will attempt to categorize the major
legal problems raided by parole, and at
the same time serve as a reference
work for those who desire to delve
more deeply into any particular phase.
Not all cases on each point will be
cited, but reference will be made to
the most complete compilation of notes
available in legal publications. Pos-
sible reforms may be occasionally sug-
gested, but this paper is primarily an
analysis of existing law.
To begin with, what is parole?
Webster defines it as7 "conditional
and revocable release ... of a prisoner
with indeterminate or unexpired sen-
fessor Sheldon Glueck.
'Special topics such as liability of a state for
the torts of an insane parolee or whether it is
reversible error for a prosecutor to stress at the
trial or a judge to instruct the jury of the pos-
sibility of parole. See 51 H. L. R. 353 (1937).
" This paper does not pretend to be more mod-
ern than May, 1941.
7Webster's Unabridged International Diction-
ery, 2nd ed.
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tence." This should be extended to
say, "who has served a part of his
sentence, the release to become abso-
lute on the expiration of his sen-
tence, provided no condition has been
violated."
Although parole has often been con-
fused with probation, there is a definite
and obvious distinction. While proba-
tion frequently follows suspended
sentence, it antedates imprisonment;
parole, on the other hand, by its very
definition, requires prior service of a
portion of the sentence. Although both
are peno-corrective devices, probation
is granted by the sentencing judge and
parole is granted by a peno-administra-
tive board, or in some states by the
governor.
Again, parole is often confused with
conditional pardon. The distinction, in
theory, is just as clear between these
two as in the case of probation, but in
practice it is another inatter. In theory,
a pardon on condition is an act of
executive grace, subject to revocation
by the executive at any time. Power
to grant a conditional pardon is inher-
ent in the pardoning power of the Con-
stitution." Occasionally, the executive
can pardon before, as well as after,
conviction or sentence. But these dis-
tinctions disappear in practice, particu-
larly in those states where the governor
is both the pardoning and the paroling
authority. In addition, where the con-
ditions attached to the pardon are sim-
ilar in nature to those attached to
parole, the two take on a marked re-
semblance. The writer will try to point
out wherever the two are confused and
8 Cf. U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 150 (1833);
Ex parte Wells, 18 How. (59 U. S.) 307, 15 L. Ed.
also where the arguments for one are
almost equally sound for the other.
The legal problems of parole to be
considered fall roughly into four groups.
The first relates to the granting of
parole. Is parole a vested right of the
prisoner? When, by whom, and for
how long can it be granted? What
crimes and criminals are excluded from
the benefits of parole?
The second set of problems relates
to the conditions that may be attached
to parole and what conditions are ille-
gal, such as extension beyond the end
of the sentence. Must the condition be
reasonable?
The third set involves questions con-
cerning the rights of a paroled prisoner,
particularly with regard to the revoca-
tion of parole. If he is still a prisoner,
does that mean that none of his civil
rights are restored by parole? Is he
subject to arrest or trial? Can his
parole be revoked only -for violation
of the conditions of parole? If his
parole is revoked', is he entitled to a
hearing on the issues of whether he
violated the conditions and whether
the revocation was properly made by
the proper authorities? What are the
respective functions, of the courts and
the .parole boards in this question of
review of revocations? Does parole
suspend sentence? Does sentence from
crime committed on parole run con-
secutively or concurrently with first
sentence?
Lastly, there are the questions in-
volving the status of a parolee of one
state who has gone to another state.
How is extradition effected? As a
conflict of laws problem, which law
421 (185); and U. S. v. Klein, 13 Wal. (80 U. S.)
128. 20 L. Ed. 519 (1871).
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governs, that of the asylum state or
that of the paroling state? What effect
has the Uniform Out-of-State Parolee
Act had on the whole problem?
Before advancing on these problems,
the writer would like to digress slightly
to give a short history of parole and
parole statutes, and to show the extent
today of the parole system. Also, as a
preliminary to the main study, a short
reference to the typical constitutional
problems involved in parole statutes
would seem to be in order. The con-
stitutional problem is exhaustively
treated in notes at 16 J. Crim. L. 40
(1925) and L.R.A. 1915 F. 531.
The most recent case involving the
constitutionality of a state parole stat-
ute arose in Illinois in 1934. The
arguments were that the statute dis-
criminated between resident and non-
resident convicts, that it violated the
Illinois constitutional provision of no
warrant without probable cause, and
that it conferred judicial power on a
government department. Although it
was not necessary to the decision, the
court answered each of the arguments,
saying, in relation to the warrant argu-
ment, that the constitutional provision
did not apply to paroled convicts still
serving sentence for which they had
been duly convicted.
H. PAROLE HISTORY
The origins of modern parole9 are
found in the first part of the nineteenth
9 A complete history of parole is found in 16
J. Crim. L. 10 (1925). Cf. 24 J. Crim. L. 88 (1933).
10 The governor of New South Wales was given
power of conditional pardon as early as 1790. For
complete histories of absolute and conditional
pardons, see 59 Am. Dec. 572 and 576 (1853).
11 Indeterminate sentence and parole seem to
have had closely parallel careers, each comple-
menting the other in an integrated reformatory
system.
century almost simultaneously with
commutation of sentence statutes in
New York and Tennessee and with
practical prison use of the "ticket of
leave" in Australia, Bavaria, Spain,
and Norfolk Island, the English penal
colony under Maconochie. The theory
and practice of outright and conditional
pardons0 also had their direct in-
fluences.
The first indeterminate sentence and
parole law" was enacted in Michigan
in 1867. Ten years later the New York
legislature embodied the so-called Re-
formatory System in a statute relating
to the newly established Elmira Re-
formatory. Both the indeterminate
sentence and the parole system were
elements of the statute. Ohio followed
suit in 1884. Michigan altered its
statute so as to copy Ohio, but the
Michigan Supreme Court declared it
unconstitutional in 1891,12 necessitating
a constitutional amendment.
However, by 1900 twenty states had
adopted a parole system for prison or
reformatory or both. In the succeeding
decade, thirteen states and the federal
government followed the trend. By
1922, Hawaii, the federal government,
and forty-four states 3 had parole laws;
while only thirty-seven states had in-
determinate sentence statutes.
The remaining four states (Florida,
Mississippi, Virginia, and Vermont)
have not been converted entirely, al-
though all but Mississippi make a prac-
12 People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 256,14 " IR A.
285.
13See appendix for tabulation of the parole
set-up in the 48 states and the federal govern-
ment, classified by the author. For a similar
work as to pardon, see 20 J. Crim. L. 364 (1929),
to which list is only to be added Florida, which
has a pardon board.
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tice of granting conditional pardons in
place of parole. In Mississippi the
prison commission probably exercises
some kind of parole power over the
state prison inmates. Virginia had
passed a parole statute'in 1904, but it
was later declared unconstitutional.
So it can be said that today some
form of parole system exists in each of
the forty-eight states, Hawaii, the
District of Columbia, and the federal
prison system, although several states
still confuse parole with conditional
pardon and confer parole power on the
board of pardons or the governor.
Various surveys of the success of
parole measured by statistics of viola-
tions reveal a gradual increase in the
number of paroles granted and a de-
crease in the number of violations,
records ranging from 5% to 35% viola-
tions.14 Because of the variables in
such a narrow survey, such as forty-
nine different prison reformatory sys-
tems and parole practices, carelessness
or dishonesty of parole boards and
parole officers, practice in some states
of automatic parole at the end of the
minimum term, and inability to check
after-life of discharged parolees, sta-
tistics of violations are of little value
except to indicate that since the parole
system has arrived as a permanent
institution, a considerable number of
violations have occurred, creating in-
superable legal, as well as administra-
tive problems. 15
14 See Federal Offenders (1939 ed.) U. S. Dep't
of Justice, Bureau of Prisons. On June 30, 1939,
there were 25,222 federal prisoners in federal,
state, and local institutions and 2,399 more out
on parole under supervision of federal parole
board. During the year, 2,601 out of 8,915 cases
considered were released on parole, and there
were only 193 violations. For the past decade the
percentage of violations under the carefully
IJI. GRA.NnG PAoL
Is Parole a Vested Right of the
Prisoner?
Almost universally the cases say it
is not. Since it is a recent statutory
method of penal treatment, this ques-
tion turns on the wording of the par-
ticular statute, except in those states
which treat parole as an off-shoot of
pardon solely within the discretion of
the executive.
Under the federal parole law, prior
to the 1930 amendment,'" the recom-
mendation of the Attorney-General
was a prerequisite to parole. Cardigan
v. White, 18 F. (2d) 572 (1927)17 held
that a prisoner has no such vested right
to parole that he' could secure his re-
lease, in a habeas corpus proceeding,
where the Attorney-General disap-
proved of the recommendation of the
federal parole board that he be released
on parole. In California similar effect
was given to the California parole act
in 1938.18 The court said that there is
no such thing as "on parole" until the
prisoner is actually released from
prison, and that where the statute
places the power to grant parole solely
within the discretion of the Board of
Prison Terms, parole becomes a matter
of grace, not of right. The actual hold-
ing was that, where the board has
granted a parole to take effect at a
future time, it can rescind its grant
without allowing the prisoner a hear-
supervised federal system has been only 6'1.
Cf. Glueck, S. and E. T., 500 Criminal Careers,
Boston, 1930.
IS See: People v. Mikula, 357 Ill. 481, 192 N. E.
546 supra.
16 18 U. S. C. A. sec. 723a.
17 Cert. den. 274 U. S. 755, 47 Sup. Ct. 770 (1927).
18Ex Parte Allen, 27 Cal. App. (2d) 447. 81
Pac. (2d) 168.
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ing. A parole does not become a vested
right upon granting.
In Ex Parte Riley,"' the North
Dakota court said that the pardon
board was not required by the 1923
parole statute to act on its own initia-
tive and parole a prisoner automatically
on the expiration of his minimum
term. The actual holding denied
habeas corpus to a prisoner who had
not served his minimum term. The
court said that even if he had served
his minimum term, he would still have
to prove that he had been harmed by
the inertia of the board.
Closely akin to this question of right
to parole was the problem involved in
Seaton v. State, 2 0 where the defendant
committed burglary while one parole
statute was in force, but was convicted
and sentenced to from five to ten years
under an amended statute, which was
in force at the time of the trial. The
former statute directed the judge to
impose a sentence of from one to ten
years; the latter directed him to raise
the minimum to five years. Since the
prisoner was eligible for parole at the
end of the minimum term under both
statutes, he was deprived of four years
of eligibility by the five year sentence.
The appellate court amended the sen-
tence to a term of from one to ten years,
thus enforcing the former statute.
On this question of eligibility for
parole the statutes seem to differ, some
being specific, others not. Duehay v.
Thompson, 223 F. 305 (1915) involved
construction of the federal act of 1913
19 52 N. D. 471, 203 N. W. 676 (1925). Cf. Red-
man v. Duehay, 246 F. 283 (1917) where the pa-
role board was upheld in refusing to grant pa-
role.
20109 Neb. 828, 192 N. W. 501 (1923).,
which provided that prisoners serving
definite terms were eligible for parole
on service of one-third of the sentence.
Defendant was sentenced to eight years,
but President Wilson commuted to
four years, and it was held that he was
eligible for parole after serving one
year and four months. Mandamus was
issued to compel the federal parole
board to consider his application for
parole, although the actual granting
was in the board's discretion. There
is a vigorous dissent by Judge Ross to
the effect that the statutory2' phrase
"one-third of the total of such term or
terms for which he was sentenced"
clearly means the original sentence im-
posed by the court, and not as com-
muted by the President.
The tendency of the courts seems to
be to treat separate sentences on dif-
ferent counts of one indictment as a
single term, rather than separate terms,
for the purposes of pardon, parole, and"
suspension.2 2 This means that a prisoner
cannot be eligible for parole until he
has served the minimum time specified
by the parole statute in relation to the
combined single term. Whether the
sentences are concurrent or consecu-
tive, of course, depends on the intent,
express or implied, of the sentencing
judge. This problem will be treated
later.
An interesting legal sidelight on the
subject of granting paroles is the valid-
ity of contracts to procure parole. The
gist of two exhaustive legal notes2 3 on
the subject seems to be that a contract
21 37 Stat. 650. Comp. St. 1913 sec. 10535, Fed.
Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1914) p. 326.
22 107 A. L. R. 634 (1936).
23 46 A. L. R. 215 (1926) and ,111 A. L. R. 35
(1937). Cf. Gordon v. Gordon, 168 Ky. 409, 182
S. W. 220, L. R. A. 1916 D, 576 (1916).
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entered into by an attorney to use his
legal services in putting the proper
information before the paroling author-
ities in an effort to obtain a parle is
valid unless the use of personal in-
fluence was contemplated. The infer-
ence is that a contract made by a
layman to aid in securing a parole
would be void as against public policy
because of the personal element pre-
sumed to be present. Of course these
contracts are legal only in those states
which do not have express statutory
prohibitions against attorneys inter-
pleading for parole.
A 1926 Arizona case24  provides
another interesting side-light. The
Arizona Supreme Court upheld a
county superior court in punishing the
superintendent of the state prison for
contempt for releasing a prisoner on a
parole which was illegally granted by
the governor. The decision is severe
on the superintendent who was only
obeying orders. The case stands for
two further propositions: that no con-
vict can be eligible for parole in Ari-
zona until he has completed his min-
imum sentence, and that the governor
has no power to parole, it being vested
exclusively in the parole board.
Who Has the Power to Grant Parole?
It is clear from the cases that in all
but the four conditional pardon
jurisdictions the power to grant parole
is lodged exclusively in that body
designated by the parole statute. In
the federal system and in twenty-five
states that power is vested in an
24 State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Superior
Court, 30 Ariz. 332, 246 Pac. 1033.
25 See appendix. The remaining four are the
conditional pardon states (Fla., Miss., Va., and
Vt.).
administrative board of which the gov-
ernor may or may not be a member;
in twelve states it is vested in the
governor alone, sometimes with ad-
visory power in a parole board, council
or commissioner; in seven states the
power is divided between the governor
and a parole board, both of whom must
concur in every parole.26
Ordinarily, the time of granting
parole is discretionary with the parol-
ing authority except that it cannot be
prior to the minimum specified by the
statute. If it is a definite sentence
jurisdiction, the statute specifies a
fraction of the sentence as a minimum;
if an indeterminate jurisdiction, the
statute specifies the minimum sentence,
generally in the form of "the minimum
sentence specified by statute for the
particular crime."
The question of duration of parole
involves the problems- of when the
parole can be revoked and whether it
can be extended beyond the original
term of sentence. These questions will
be considered later under more ap-
propriate headings.
What Crimes and Criminals Are Ex-
cluded26 by Statute from the Benefits
of Parole, and Are These Provisions
Constitutional?
In some states only first offenders are
eligible for parole; in others no dis-
crimination is made against recidivists.
Prisoners sentenced to life imprison-
ment are eligible after a specified term,
generally fifteen years, as in the federal
statute, or are not eligible at all. In
26 See 59 Am. Dec. 573 (1853) for list of crimes
at common law for which the executive could
grant pardon.
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those states having an indeterminate
sentence law, parole may not be had
until service of the minimum term,
unless there is no minimum term, as
in New York for the Elmira Reforma-
tory. In the same state the law may
differ according to the penal institu-
tion. New York, for example, has
different provisions for the prisons, the
reformatory, the reform schools, and
the first-class city prisons.
Those crimes which, almost univer-
sally, are excluded by statute from
parole consideration are treason, first-
degree murder, third conviction of
felony, and very often those crimes
which are subject to punishment by
life imprisonment, such as rape, in the
southern states, and kidnapping.
What Provisions Are Made as to
Race, Sex, or Age?
No discrimination could be found
against race, in specific terms, but as
to age, several statutes exclude those
over a certain age. Wyoming, for
example, disqualifies from parole con-
sideration all convicts over twenty-five.
Most indeterminate and parole statutes
apply only to men over sixteen or
eighteen and women over eighteen.
This leaves opportunity for specific
juvenile delinquency legislation.
Whenever these provisions have been
contested on constitutional grounds,
they have been upheld on the basis of
their being a general law applicable to
all.2
7
In using their discretion to grant or
not to grant parole, the parole boards,
in practice, tend to emphasize, some-
27 Cf. People v. Mikula, 357 Ill. 481, 192 N. E.
548 (1934).
times unduly, the nature of the crime
and the sentence. Proper weight
should, of course, be given to other
factors, including the individual record
and personal attitude of the prisoner.
Criteria used by intelligent boards in-
clude these questions: Will the best
interests of society be served by his
release? Has he kept the institutional
rules? Has he shown the ability and
the desire to lead a law-abiding life?
Have suitable work and decent sur-
roundings been found for him? Was
the nature of his crime such that he
might be a menace to society? Did he
use force in its commission? Were there
extenuating circumstances? What is
his previous criminal record? What is
his status after examination by com-
petent doctors and psychiatrists? Vary-
ing emphasis will be given to the dif-
ferent factors as the circumstances
require. Court review of the weight
that should be given to these factors
is non-existent.
IV. CoNDiTIONs ATTACHED TO PAROLE
What Conditions May Be Attached
to Parole?
The general ride seems to be that
any reasonable condition which is not
immoral, illegal, or impossible of per-
formance may be made a part of the
parole.
2
Conditions range2 9 from vague gen-
eralities like "obey the law faithfully"
to oppressive minutiae like "shall be
off the streets nightly at 10 p. m." The
three most frequent conditions are that
the parolee shall be law-abiding, that
he shall report monthly in detail as to
28 Cf. 59 Am. Dec. 576 et seq. for conditions at-
tachable to pardon.
29 See 12 J. Crim. L. 554 (1921).
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his working and leisure habits, and that
he shall be subject to reimprisonment
for violation of any of the prescribed
conditions. Another is the territorial
condition that he shall not cross a
county or state line without permission
from the paroling authorities. Often a
board will impose detailed regulations
which do more harm than good. For
instance, it may require that the paro-
lee attend church regularly, refrain
from tobacco and liquor, and be at
home every night before ten o'clock.
Such unintelligent administration begs
for minor violations without contrib-
uting to the reformation of the
prisoner.
The statute or the parole instrument
may state that, in the discretion of the
board or governor, the prisoner may be
unconditionally discharged after a cer-
tain term spent on parole, say one year;
or the prisoner may be regarded as
being within the constructive custody
of the parole authorities until the expi-
ration of his maximum term. As to
whether a condition may subject the
parolee to supervision beyond his max-
imum term, there seems to be a split of
authority. Theoretically, the prisoner
is serving time while on parole and
should be unconditionally released at
the expiration of his maximum term,
less any time earned for good conduct
under a specific statute. In practice,
however, the cases vary widely. Some
follow the true theory of parole; 30
others liken parole to conditional par-
don and say that by accepting the
eondition the prisoner is bound forever,
regardless of the expiration of the max-
30 Ex Parte Prout, 12 Ida. 494, 86 Pac. 275, 5
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1064 (1906).
31 Stephens v. Bertrand, 151 Kan. 270, 98 Pac.
(2d) 123 (1940).
imum sentence." The cases under the
federal law are a sort of hybrid of these
two theories, holding that a prisoner is
serving his sentence while on parole
and will be unconditionally released at
the end of the maximum term, but if he
is retaken for violation of any condi-
tion prior to the end of the maximum
term, he is subject to his unexpired
sentence without credit for the term he
served on parole.32 These decisions are
necessitated by the statutory words,
"the time the prisoner was on parole
shall not diminish the time he was
originally sentenced to serve."'33
In the Stephens case the parole docu-
ment expressly set out the condition
"that the defendant violate no laws of
Kansas for a period of two years." This
was upheld despite the fact that the
defendant had been sentenced only for
six months and had already served part
of that when granted parole. The
explanation is that by the law of Kansas
a parole operates to suspend sentence
so that the balance of the sentence
hangs over the parolee's head until the
fulfillment of the condition.
On the contrary, in Ex Parte Prout
the Idaho Supreme Court, as early as
1906, recognized the general principle
that no condition to a pardon or parole
can be immoral or illegal. It held illegal
a condition which provided that the
parolee, on revocation of his parole for
any violation of its conditions, would
be subject to reimprisonment and serv-
ice of his original unserved sentence
without credit for the period spent on
parole. The theory was that the con-
dition was tantamount to an illegal
32See Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U. S. 359, 58 Sup.
Ct. 872 (1938) and Anderson v. Corall, 263 U. S.
193, 44 Sup. Ct. 43 (1923).
"3 18 U. S. C. A. chap. 22, sec. 723c.
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extension of sentence. The court
reached the proper result, but it con-
fused the true meaning of parole,
construing it as an act of clemency
rather than the modern idea of regula-
tory reformation. The court tacitly
approved conditions of a minor nature,
such as remaining within certain county
boundaries and sending to the warden
a monthly written report certified by
the employer of the parolee, stating his
employment, earnings, and itemized ex-
penditures. In the instant case the
prisoner had been sentenced to three
years and was paroled after serving
seventeen months. Five months latei
his parole was revoked for alleged vio-
lation of conditions and he was reim-
prisoned. After serving fifteen months
more, he applied for habeas corpus on
the ground that his sentence had ex-
pired, and the writ was granted.
Those cases holding the opposite
view, like the Stephens case, supra, are
distinguishable on the ground that they
liken parole to conditional pardon so
that sentence is suspended by the
granting of parole" and the conditions
remain in force indefinitely.
V. PAROLEE'S RIGHTS; REVOCATION
Are a Prisoner's Civil Rights
Restored by Parole?
The cases are silent, but the sensible
answer would seem to be in the nega-
tive; that since parole is not a form of
pardon (although many courts have so
treated it), the parolee is still a prisoner
:' I For the various cases, see 5 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1064 (1906); 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 304 (1908); 26
L. R. A. (N. S.) 110 (1910). Cf. Wilborn v.
Saunders, 170 Va. 153, 195 S. E. 723 (1938).
::- See 4 Black. Com. 402 for common law effect
of pardon. Cf. Ex parte Wells, supra. For effect
of conditional pardon as not restoring civil
serving out his sentence, albeit in a less
confining environment than prison,
with the opportunity of being restored
to society.' He stands in no better posi-
tion, with minor exceptions, than a con-
vict still in prison, in relation to civil
rights such as voting, holding public
office, serving as a witness or a juror.
As to property rights, he has advantage
over the prison inmate only in that he
is, to a certain extent, free to use or
dispose of his property in the outside
world; but parole, unlike pardon, does
not restore any property rights for-
feited by conviction. '5
Is a Parolee Subject to Arrest?
Under some statutes a parolee is in
the same position as a prison inmate in
respect to arrest, and he cannot law-
fully be taken and confined by police
authorities for pending indictment" or
prior conviction.:37 The theory seems to
be that he is constructively within the
prison walls and is thus immune from
arrest. Although the court will not re-
voke his "parole" merely to allow the
district attorney to arrest him under a
pending indictment, People v. Whit-
comb seems to say that the parole offi-
cer will produce the parolee at the trial
of the indictment. But the parolee's
immunity from arrest does not extend
to crimes committed while he is on pa-
role. Ordinarily, the parole board has
first chance at the delinquent parolee,
but if the board is slow, the arrest by
police for crime committed on parole is
rights, see 1 Bish Crim. L. sec. 898. Cf. 19 Tex.
App. 635, 53 Am. Rep. 395 (1885).
3, People v. Whitcomb 118 Misc. 615, 194 N. Y.
Supp. 209 (1922). The court's opinion obscures
the fact as to whether it is parole or probation.
37 State ex rel. Nicholson v. Bush, 136 Tenn.
478, 190 S. W. 453 (1916).
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condoned."- He may or may not be
ordered to serve his second sentence
before the unexpired part of his first
sentence.
The parolee also has a right to free-
dom from unlawful arrest. In People v.
Bendoni, :' the Michigan prisoner, who
had been convicted of armed robbery,
was out on parole to a "next friend" in
Pennsylvania on the condition that he
stay outside Michigan until his sentence
was served. The Michigan statute pro-
vided that the warden had the sole
power to arrest and return parolee to
prison upon violation of parole condi-
tions. The parolee returned to Mich-
igan one Christmas for the holidays to
see his sister, under express written
permission from the next friend. A
policeman arrested him on sight,
searched him at the station, and found
a concealed revolver. He was tried,
convicted, and confined to prison for
carrying concealed weapons, his sen-
tence to run after service of the un-
expired part of his first term, which
had been called into play by the parol-
ing authorities. The Michigan Supreme
Court reversed the conviction on the
ground of unlawful arrest by the police-
man, illegal search for evidence, and
use of illegal evidence at the trial. But
the prisoner was not sent safely back
to Pennsylvania. Instead, the court re-
manded him to the tender mercies of
the warden for disposition on the parole
violation.
The parolee's right to freedom from
arrest does not extend to freedom from
indictment and trial for an offense com-
38 See Anderson v. Corall, supra, and Stockton
v. Massey, infra.
39 263 Mich. 295, 248 N. W. 627 (1933).
40 See L. R. A. 1915 E, 363 and 41 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1095 (1913).
initted prior or subsequent to the crime
for which he has been paroled.' Since
he can be put on trial for another crime
while on parole, his freedom from ar-
rest appears to be without substance in
the pending indictment situation, and is
only of value where he is wanted for
prior conviction.
Where a person. on conviction of a
crime, is sentenced and fined at the
same time, a later parole will not re-
lieve him from payment of the fine,
unless the parole instrument so states.
But where, by operation of statute, a
parolee becomes unconditionally dis-
charged through failure of the paroling
authorities to take appropriate action
within the prescribed statutory time,
he is thereby also relieved from pay-
ment of the fine, which was part of the
original punishment." But a distinc-
tion seems to be drawn between fines
and costs, and the parolee remains li-
able for the latter,4" even though they
were a part of the original punishment.
By Whom and for What Reasons
Can Parole Be Revoked?
Ordinarily the statutes provide that
the same authority which granted pa-
role has the power to set the conditions
and to revoke the parole, in its discre-
tion, for violation of those conditions.
The problems arise where the statutes
are ambiguous or silent. Must the pa-
role board give reasons for revoking?
Some statutes require, not only that
reasons be given, but, more important.
that the parolee be given an oppor-
tunity to refute those reasons at a hear-
41 Badgley v. Morse, 132 Kan. 544. 296 Pac. 344
(1931).
42 See 74 A. L. R. 1121 (1931) for the effect of
pardon on fines and costs.
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ing. The serious questions arise where
no such provision is made.
When Can Parole Be Revoked?
In all but the "conditional pardon"
jurisdictions, the answer is any time
prior to, but not later than the end of
the maximum sentence. A federal
case 43 held that, inasmuch as revoca-
tion had been made before the end of
the maximum term, the arrest could be
deferred until the prosecution, convic-
tion, and sentence for a separate crime
were completed, even though this was
beyond the maximum sentence term.
But in Ex parte Ridley 44 the Oklahoma
court treated the parole as a conditional
pardon suspending sentence and held
that the governor could revoke a parole
after the expiration of the maximum
term. The prisoner had been sentenced
to four years and paroled after serving
two years and a half. He committed
the violation about a week after his
four years was up, and the governor
immediately revoked the parole with-
out a hearing. In a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding the parolee was held to have
the right to a court hearing on the issue
of his violation. The court found that
he had violated the condition not to
frequent liquor establishments, and so
remanded him to prison, thereby up-
holding a seemingly illegal condition.
The "conditional pardon" cases in-
volving the imprisonment of the parolee
beyond his maximum sentence fall
roughly into two groups: those in
43 Stockton v. Massey, 34 F. (2d) 96 (1929). Cf.
Platek v. Aderhold, 73 F. (2d) 173 (1934).
443 Okla. Crim. 350, 106 Pac. 549 (1910).
45 Stephens v. Bertrand, supra. Contra: Ex
parte Prout, supra.
46 Ex parte Ridley, supra; Ex parte Patterson,
94 Kan. 439, 146 Pac. 1009 (1915); Contra: Wood-
ward v. Murdock, 124 Ind. 439, 24 N. E. 1047 (18q0).
which the parole instrument, itself, sub-
jects the parolee to unfulfilled condi-
tions extending beyond his maximum
term,'5  and those in which the parole
is revoked and the parolee retaken de-
spite the silence of the instrument.";
Is the Parolee Entitled to a Hearing
on Revocation of His Parole?
There are three possible situations:
The statute is specific as to hearing or
summary revocation, the parole docu-
ment itself is specific, or neither is
specific. The general rule seems to be
that in the absence of any specific pro-
vision to the contrary he is entitled to
a court hearing on the issue of viola-
tion of conditions.4T Ex parte Ridley,
supra, and State v. Wolfer,48 although
both involve conditional pardon lan-
guage, illustrate the labored arguments
for protection of the individual from
arbitrary bureaucratic action by the
right to a hearing in court. The latter
case indicated that the prisoner might
be entitled to a jury trial49 if his identity
were in issue. In the final analysis, the
blame for these decisions lies with the
legislature in failing to make the statute
specific.
Where the statute provides for sum-
mary revocation at the discretion of
the board, it is generally upheld on the
ground that a parole violation is not a
new crime nor is return to prison a
new punishment, for a parolee has al-
ready been accorded all his rights and
has been duly convicted, so that he
47 For cases, see 54 A. L. R. 1474 (1927) cf. Flee-
nor v. Hammond, 28 F. Supp. 625 (W. D. Ky.
1939).
4s 53 Minn. 135, 54 N. W. 1065, 19 L. R. A. 783
(1893).
49 See dictum in Kennedy's case, 135 Mass. 48
(1883).
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stands in the position of a prisoner, at
large in the discretion of the board.50
The California statute in In Re Tobin
was interpreted to mean that no hear-
ing is required on the issue of revoca-
tion, but that one is required before the
parole board on the issue of forfeiture
of credits. Under the Parole Commis-
sion Law for First Class Cities in New
York State, revocation of parole is not
subject to judicial review, but is exclu-
sively in the hands of the parole com-
mission, whether the issue be violation
of conditions,," or legal grant of parole
in the first place.52
Where the statute or the parole in-
strument expressly provides for a hear-
ing, it is generally interpreted to mean
hearing before the paroling authority.53
But where there is no specific provision,
as already explained, the courts insist
on a hearing in court. The distinction
apparently arises from the courts' over-
zealous anxiety to preserve their place
in the protection of the individual
wherever the legislature was silent. It
seems that the court will'not inquire
into the nature of the hearing given by
the board, unless the parolee can pro-
duce substantial contradictory evi-
dence. In U. S. ex rel. Rowe v. Nichol-
sons' it was held that the federal parole
board's formal certificate that a hearing
was given could not be collaterally up-
set in a habeas corpus proceeding
merely by the parolee's verbal contra-
diction.
50 In Re Tobin, 130 Cal. App. 371, 20 Pac. (2d)
91 (1933); ES parte Patterson, supra; People ex
rel. Romain v. N. Y. C. Parole Commission, 116
Misc. 758, 191 N. Y. Supp. 410 (1921).
51 People ex rel. Romain v. Commission, supra.
52 People ex rel. Rabiner v. Warden of City
Prison, 209 App. Div. 795, 205 N. Y. Supp. 694
(1924).
55 The federal statute expressly says, "hear-
ing before the parole board."
In the third situation, where the pa-
role instrument expressly reserves to
the paroling authority the power of
summary revocation without hearing,
the parolee is generally heid to be
bound by the express provision.5 One
line of reasoning seems to be that the
waiver of hearing was made a condi-
tion to ,the parole contract, and the
parolee, by his acceptance of the con-
dition, is bound thereby. Although the
analogy to contracts is subject to at-
tack,56 the result of these cases is cor-
rect except where the question arises
of keeping the prisoner beyond his
term. It would -seem that no degree of
willingness on the part of the prisoner
could bargain him beforehand into a
longer term of imprisonment than that
imposed by the sentencing court, but
apparently that is just what is done in
those jurisdictions treating parole as
conditional pardon suspending sentence
until reconfinement, often after the
original term of sentence has expired.
Ex parte Prout and Woodward v.
Murdock, supra, and the federal cases
cited previously are among those up-
holding the true parole theory that the
parole cannot be revoked after the
original term of sentence has expired.
These cases uphold the condition of
summary revocation before the end of
the term, not on the theory of con-
tracts, but on the ground that the parol-
ing authority has the power to impose
54 78. F. (2d) 468 (1935): cert. den. 296 U. S.
573, 56 Sup. Ct. 118. Cf. Shearer v. Sanford, 115
F. (2d) 214 (1940).
55 Owen v. Smith, 89 Neb. 596. 131 N. W. 914
(1911); Ex parte Collins, 32 Okla. Crim. 6, 239
Pac. 693 (1925). See Ex parte Woodward. 58
Okla. Crim. 333, 53 Pac. (2d) 288 (1936) affirming
the rule in the Collins case.
56 See 39 H. L. I. 112, n. 12 (1925) for the same
problem in relation to conditional pardon.
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any reasonable condition."; Fleanor v.
Hammond, supra, which involves a con-
ditional pardon, illustrates the rule that
where the pardon or parole instrument
fails clearly to reserve arbitrary power
of revocation, it will be interpreted
most favorably to the parolee so as to
entitle him to a hearing.
It is apparently the law that in all
situations, even where the statute or the
parole instrument expressly abolishes
any hearing, the parolee is entitled to
a hearing before a court of competent
jurisdiction on three issues: 1. Con-
finement beyond his term,5 8 2. Au-
thority of the persons revoking to re-
voke,5 9 3. Parolee's identity."° As noted
above, however, the question whether
there has been a violation of parole
conditions is seldom reviewable except
in the first situation where there is an
absence of specific provisions."
Is Violation of the Conditions of Parole
a Separate Crime Subject to Court
Trial, Conviction, and
Separate Sentence?
Pennsylvania produces this anomaly
by a statute providing that a parole
violation is a misdemeanor. Such a
statute results from the failure to
understand that the efficacy of a parole
system depends on authority being
lodged solely in one administrative
board with disciplinary power to deal
with parole violations.
51 7See Lime v. Blagg, 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d)
583 (1939) for failure of lifer's argument that
"sick parole" amounted to commutation not re-
vokable without court review.
5s A strong minority of cases, using "condi-
tional pardon" language, holds that confinement
beyond the term is not in issue where the pa-
rolee has accepted that condition to the parole
contract.
59 See Ex parte Collins, supra, holding that the
arbitrary power of revocation devolved on the
The granting of parole to a convicted
person, pending appeal of his convic-
tion, seems to operate as a waiver of
his appeal according to the only re-
ported case directly involving that
point. 1' The Oklahoma court went on
the theory that an appeal was incon-
sistent with acceptance of parole.
Does a Parole Operate to Suspend the
Running of the Parolee's Sentence?
Does the time served out on parole
fall to the parolee's credit in the com-
putation of the service of his sentence?
These are questions of particular im-
portance to the parolee when the pa-
roling authority attempts to revoke his
parole. Theoretically, the indetermi-
nate sentence and parole system is de-
signed to confine the criminal for a
reformatory period within the institu-
tion and a subsequent, though less con-
fining, reformatory period outside the
institution. This means that the prisoner
is still sdrving his sentence while on
parole, under the supervision of the
parole board. However, the variety of
statutes in force during the past few
decades has given all kinds of weird
effects to the original purpose. And
where the legislature has been con-
fused, the court has taken it upon it-
self to put meaning into the ambiguity,
thus adding to the confusion.
The cases fall roughly into three
groups:6 3 1. Those in which parole
suspends sentence, with or without
lieutenant-governor after the impeachment of
the governor.
60 Dicta in two cases. See notes 48 and 49
supra.
c1 See People v. Murphy, 274 N. Y. 281, 8 N. E.
(2d) 861 (1937) for statutory jury trial only on
question of fact as to violation.
6 Rogers v. State, 62 Okla. Crim. 349, 71 Pac.
(2d) 635 (1937).
63 For cases see 68 L. Ed. 247 (1923): 28 A. L. R.
947 (1922); and 116 A. L. R. 811 (1938). Cf. Wil-
born v. Saunders, 170 Va. 153, 195 S. E. 723 (1938).
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statutory expression, 2. Those in which
it does not, with or without enlighten-
ment from the statute, and 3. Cases un-
der the hybrid federal statute, which
provides that parole does not suspend
sentence, but that time served on pa-
role is not credited to the parolee if
he is reimprisoned for a violation com-
mitted before the expiration of his
sentence.
The Oklahomaj Kansas, and Vermont
cases4 seem to fall in the non-statutory
section of the first group. The Idaho
and Indiana cases fall into the non-
statutory section of the second group."
Anderson v. Corall and Stockton v.
Massey, supra, and similar cases fall
under the third group.
The question generally arises in a
habeas corpus proceeding brought by
the parolee to determine the legality of
the revocation and the length of his
legal confinement. The cases are in
confusion because of the failure of the
courts to distinguish the three situ-
ations: 1. Where the parole violation
occurred after the expiration of the
maximum sentence, 2: Where it oc-
curred after the expiration of the maxi-
mum sentence less the statutory time
for good behavior, and 3. Where it oc-
curred before the end of the maximum
term while the prisoner was still on
parole. In all these cases the parole
board is trying to confine the prisoner
for the balance of his unserved sen-
tence without credit for time served on
parole. Obviously, under the first situ-
ation, the board has lost its jurisdiction
over the parolee,6 except in those juris-
64 Cf. Ex parte Collins, supra; Stephens v.
Bertrand, 151 Kan. 270, 98 Pac. (2d) 123 (1940);
Ex parte McKenna, 79 Vt. 34, 64 At. 77 (1906).
65 Ex parte Prout and Woodward v. Murdock,
#upra. Cf. Crooks v. Saunders, 123 S. C. 28, 115
dictions which analogize parole to con-
ditional pardon- suspending sentence
indefinitely.
To what ridiculous extremes a court
can go in revoking parole beyond the
maximum term is evidenced by the
Oklahoma case of Ex parte Butler."
Here, the prisoner was convicted of
adultery, sentenced to eighteen months,
and paroled after serving seven months.
Twelve years later he was convicted of
driving under the influence and was
sentenced to one year. During his serv-
ice of that sentence the governor re-
voked the original parole. The court
upheld the governor's contention that
the prisoner was subject to the un-
expired eleven months of the adultery
sentence after the completion of his
second sentence. This is the logical
result ad absurdum of following the
earlier Oklahoma cases that parole sus-
pends sentence indefinitely.
The second situation requires the ex-
istence of a statute providing for a re-
duction in time for good behavior.
Woodward v. Murdock, supra, held that
the governor had lost his jurisdiction
to revoke the parole after the prisoner
had served his sentence, as reduced by
the statutory good time allowance and
time on parole.* In Ex parte McKenna,
supra, it was held that the statutory
deduction would be applied in the final
computation, but that the 'prisoner was
still subject to his unserved term, even
though more time had elapsed than the
maximum term.
Under the third situation, it is clear
that the parole board still has juris-
S. E. 760, 28 A. L. R. 940 (1922).
6f Cf. Ex parte Prout, supra.
OT Cf. Ex parte Ridley and Ex parte McKenna,
supr.
68 40 Okla. Crim. 434, 269 Pac. 786 (1928).
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diction, and it seems equally clear that
upon recommitment the prisoner should
be credited with the time served on
parole, unless there is a statutory pro-
vision to the contrary, such as the fed-
eral one.
Is the Second Sentence Consecutive
or Concurrent?
When a prisoner commits a crime
while on parole and is convicted and
sentenced, does his second sentence run
consecutively or concurrently69 with
the unexpired portion of his first sen-
tence? Where a statute expressly pro-
vides for this situation, there is seldom
any legal problem.70  In Re Daniels
7
'
the court held that a parolee convicted
of another crime who did not inform
the sentencing judge of the first sen-
tence and parole, could not later, by
availing himself of the statute requiring
the judgment to state whether consecu-
tive or concurrent, evade the remainder
of his first sentence.
Nor is there any problem where the
judgment expressly states that the sec-
ond sentence shall run consecutively or
concurrently with the first sentence.72
In the absence of statute or express
provision in the second judgment to
the contrary, the general rule seems to
be that the second sentence runs con-
currently with the unserved part of the
first.7 3 This was the rule followed in
White v. Kwiatkowski,7 4 although the
69 See 116 A. L. . 811 (1938).
70 See N. Y. Correction Law sec. 218, 219, re-
quiring first sentence, first service. Cf. People
ex rel. Block v. Warden, 252 App. Div. 825, 299
N. Y. Supp. 357 (1937); People v. Loveless, 140
Cal. App. 291, 35 Pac. (2d) 574 (1934).
71110 Cal. App. 638, 294 Pac. 735 (1930).
72 People v. Loveless, n. 70 supra.
73See 5 A. L. R. 380 (1919); 53 A. L. R. 625
federal parole statute was subject to the
opposite interpretation 5 as well. Should
this general rule be applied to parole
situations? Theoretically, the parolee
is subject only to the disciplinary action
of the parole board. For an appellate
court to declare the sentences concur-
rent, especially where the offenses were
committed in different jurisdictions,
seems to be an unwarranted extension
of judicial power and a nullification of
the purpose of the parole system.
In Zerbst v. Kidwell, the United
States Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Black, resolved the
chaotic federal situation and held that
the federal parole statute meant the
sentences to be consecutive. Section
723c of the statute was interpreted7 6 to
mean that the unexpired portion of the
first sentence does not begin to run on
imprisonment for the second crime, but
only on reimprisonment on the original
sentence at the behest of the parole
board. The effect of the second crime
was to suspend the sentence for the first
crime during the imprisonment for the
second crime. Because of the additional
factor under the statute that time on
parole is not counted in the final com-
putation, the prisoners were forced to
serve out their original sentence as if
no parole had been granted. The de-
cision amounts to overruling White v.
Kwiatkowski, although the latter case
was not specifically mentioned. As a
(1927). Ex parte McDonald, 178 Wis. 167, 189
N. W. 1029 (1922).
74 60 F. (2d) 264 (1932) Tenth Circuit.
7S Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U. S. 359, 58 Sup. Ct.
872 (1938).
76 18 USCA chap. 22, sec. 723c: "The unexpired
term of imprisonment shall begin to run from the
date he is returned to the institution, and the
time he was on parole shall not diminish the time
he was originally sentenced to serve."
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result, the Tenth Circuit reversed its
position in two later cases. 7 The su-
preme court had already led the way
in 1923 in Anderson v. Corall, supra,
so that no other result could logically
have been reached in the Zerbst case.
The law in the federal jurisdictions
is now clear in the field of consecutive
versus concurrent sentence for con-
victed parolees, but the state law is still
a jumble. The case of Canfield v. Parole
Commissioner8 illustrates that Mich-
igan, at least, has a definite position.
The case serves as a good example of
the various aspects of the rights of a
paroled convict which can be put in
issue in one litigation, with particular
reference to the interpretation of Mich-
igan statutes. Here, the prisoner was
convicted i December, 1926, of break-
ing and entering, and was sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of from
two fo five years, although the statute
called for a maximum of fifteen years.
In August, 1928, he was paroled, but
was hardly out when he was convicted
of armed robbery, and sentenced in
December to from twenty to forty
-years. In March,.1929, the parole com-
missioner revoked the parole without
a hearing and ordered the parolee to
serve out his unexpired first term be-
fore commencing his second sentence.
This procedure was in strict compli-
ance with the statute. In .February,
1936, the commissioner invoked his
statutory authority to annul the re-
maining portion of the first sentence,
in order to enable the prisoner to start
service of his second sentence. The
prisoner brought mandamus to compel
the commissioner to correct the prison
77 Aderhold v. Ashock, 99 F. (2d) 67 (1938) and
Aderhold v. Murphy, 103 F. (2d) 492 (1939).
records so as to show that his second
sentence began to run in December,
1928, at the time it was imposed. But
the Michigan Supreme Court unani-
mously refused the writ, upholding the
commissioner's contention that the sec-
ond sentence began in February, 1936.
It said that the original sentence was
void and should be treated as for a
maximum of fifteen years, as the statute
required. It ran until annulled in Feb-
ruary, 1936, when the second sentence
came into force. On the point of re-
vocation without hearing, the court held
that the parole statute refused the
privilege of hearing to the prisoner
where he was convicted of a felony
while on parole.
When There Are Two Possible Parole
Statutes to Be Applied, Which
Is the Governing One?
If the later statute is enforced, is it
unconstitutionally retroactive? In Peo-
ple ex rel. Tower v. Hunt, 36 F. Supp.
49 (1940), the district court held that
the parolee was subject to the revoca-
tion procedure prescribed by the statute
in force when he violated his parole, not
when he was convicted and sentenced,
or paroled. Here the New York statute
prior to 1930 gave a parolee the right
to a jury trial on the question of viola-
tion of parole conditions and provided
that the arrest warrant should be issued
by a magistrate. The amendment of
1930 placed sole power in the hands of
the parole board. The prisoner was
convicted and paroled before 1930, but
violated his parole in 1937. He -was
held subject to the amendment on the
theory that he was in the constructive
78 280 Mich. 305, 273 N. W. 578 (1937).
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custody of the prison warden until the
end of his maximum term and so was
subject to the law which was in effect
when he violated his parole."'
VI. EXTRADITION OF PAROLEES
When a Parolee of One State Goes to
Another State, Can He Be Extradited
for Violation of His Parole?
As a conflict of laws problem, which
law governs? Theoretically, the law of
the paroling state should govern, and
the only reasonable requirement for
rendition should be that the parolee has
an unexpired sentence in the demand-
ing state which the parole board feels
that he should finish. In practice, that
seems to be the general rule, although
it has been held that where the violat-
ing act occurred in the asylum state,
the courts of the latter state can deter-
mine whether it actually was a 'viola-
tion. Such was the holding in People
ex rel. Pahl v. Pollack,0 where the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, refused to grant extradition of a
Pennsylvania parolee on the ground
that the alleged violative act had not
been shown and that the Pennsylvania
parole board would fail to accord the
parolee a fair hearing on this issue.
Here, the parolee had been granted
permission by the Pennsylvania Board
of Pardons to return to his native state
of New York. Upon a charge of being
accessory to an abortion, he was ar-
rested by the New York State Parole
79 Cf. Magistro v. Wilson, 253 App. Div. 48, 300
N. Y. Supp. 1216 (1937).
so 174 Misc. 981, 22 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 413 (1940);
cf. 54 H. L. R. 508 (1941).
13, Cf. Ex parte La Vere, 39 Nev. 214 156 Pac. 446
(1916), where the Nevada Court declared that the
evidence clearly showed that the prisoner was
not a fugitive from New Jersey, intimating that
if the evidence had been conflicting, it would
have left the matter to the demanding state. No
Board and later released. Then the
Pennsylvania board requested the Gov-
ernor of Pennsylvania for the parolee's
extradition, and his requisition was
honored by the New York Governor,
who had the parolee arrested. On a
habeas corpus hearing, the New York
court found no evidence of guilt of the
abortion charge, after the original com-
plaining witness withdrew her accusa-
tion, and granted the writ. The court's
theory, apparently, was that the Penn-
sylvania parole board would be preju-
diced against the parolee and thus
would not give him a fair hearing. New
York seems to be the only jurisdiction
to hold that the courts of the asylum
state can look behind the extradition
warrant for an out-of-state parolee, and
inquire into the nature of the alleged
violation."' It is clearly the only case
to use the ground of probable prejudice
of the foreign parole board. The gen-
eral rule is that the courts of the asylum
- state will neglect or refuse to go into
the propriety of the parole revocation.2
There is an intimation, however, in
Ex parte Carroll, 86 Tex. Crim. 301,
217 S. W. (2d) 382 (1920), that the
court might be. slower to refuse habeas
corpus if the parolee could show by
conclusive evidence that he had not
violated his parole and was not a fugi-
tive from justice.
The cases can be divided conveni-
ently into two groups, those in which
the parolee entered another state with
parole was involved. See Glass v. Becker, 25 F.
(2d) 929 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
82 State ex rel. Cooney v. Hoffmeister, 336 Mo.
682, 80 S. W. (2d) 195 (1935); Ex parte Foster, 60
Okla. Crim. 50, 61 Pac. (2d) 37 (1936); Ex parte
Walton, 133 Tex. Crim. 534, 112 S. W. (2d) 467
(1937); Ex parte Gordon, 105 Vt. 277, 165 Atl. 905
(1933). Cf. 18 USCA sec. 662, note 61, pp. 329, 330,
331. Reed v. Colpoys, 69 App. D. C. 163, 99 F. (2d)
396 (1938).
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the permission or at the request of the
parole board, and those in which he vio-
lated his parole by his very act of enter-
ing the second state. As .to the latter
situation, it has been clear since 1896,
when the Connecticut court in the case
of Drinkall v. Spiega83 refused habeas
corpus to a New York parolee, that
extradition cannot be questioned. Prop-
erly authenticated requisition- papers
are all that seem to be necessary.- In
regard to the situation where a condi-
tion .of the parole is that the parolee
reside and work in another state, it
seems equally clear that he is subject
to extradition and the court of the
asylum state will not inquire into the
violative act."5 Where the parolee has
secured the later permission of the
board to enter another state, it has now
become the settled law that he is sub-
ject to extradition at the duly authenti-
cated request of the paroling state,8
although some of the courts had trouble
interpreting the word "flee" in Article
IV, Section 2 of the federal Constitution
to apply to the situation where the
parolee left with the board's permission
and blessing.
The word "flee" has two components:
voluntary departure, and intent to flee.
The widespread adoption of the Uni-
form Criminal Extradition Act8 7 seems
to be eliminating the intent to flee as a
prerequisite to extradition, but the is-
sue of voluntary departure is still
open.88 However, the New Jersey court
has taken a lone stand in the interests
83 68 Conn. 441, 36 Ati. 830, 36 L. R. A. 486.
84 See Ex parte Gordon, supra, n. 82, and Ex
parte Carroll, supra.
85 Ex parte Nabors, 33 N. M. 324, 267 Pac. 58
(1928).
81, 54 H. L. I. 508 (Jan. 1941) lists the cases. Cf.
78 A. L. R. 422 (1931); Ex parte Garvey, 133 Tex.
Crim. 500. 112 S. W. (2d) 747 (1938); Bartel v.
of justice and held a parolee extradit-
able even though he was involuntarily
forced across the state line by police
authorities 9 Here, a New York pa-
rolee was convicted in New York of a
federal offense and taken to New Jersey
to serve his sentence in the federal
prison. Leaving New York state was
a violation of one of the parole condi-
tions. Upon his release in New Jersey,
he petitioned for habeas corpus, but the
court refused to giant his freedom,
holding the motives and causes of his
leaving New York immaterial.
In order to bring within the defini-
tion of "fugitive from justice," the Illi-
nois court in People ex rel. Mark v.
Toman ° did some fancy talking. Here,
the Illinois Supreme Court declared the
parolee extraditable to New York and
dismissed the appeal of a second habeas
corpus proceeding, after a lower court
had twice granted the parolee's release
and uttered dire threats at the per-
sistent New York parole agents. The
reasoning of the appellate court was
that the parolee became extraditable,
not as a parole violator, but as a "fugi-
tive from justice" the moment that the
New York parole board revoked his
parole and invoked his unexpired sen-
tence. The case is also interesting for
the proposition that a habeas corpus
judgment in an extradition case does
not go to the merits sufficiently to
render it res judicata, but further extra-
dition proceeding is possible.
O'Grady, ... Neb ... , 292 N. W. 383 (1940).
87 9 Unif. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1938) 39-40.
88 Cf. 40 H. L. R. 902 (1927); 51 H. L. R. 1446
(1938).
HO Re Cohen, 104 N. J. Eq. 560, 146 AtI. 423 (1928).
This is in accord with the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of "flee" in Appleyard v.
Mass., 203 U. S. 222, 27 Sup. Ct. 122.
D0 362 Ill. 232, 199 N. E. 124 (1935).
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Some courts have had difficulty with
the phrase "charged with crime" in the
Constitution. But in 1905 the Circuit
Court of AFpeals decided that this in-
cluded conviction as well as the tech-
nical charge or indictment before con-
viction."
It seems to matter little whether the
act alleged to be a parole violation oc-
curred in the asylum state or the parol-
ing state. Other than the two excep-
tions already noted,92 the court of the
asylum state will not look into the evi-
dence to determine the justification for
extradition. 3 Even where the total
time elapsed from conviction exceeds
the sentence, the court will refuse to
usurp the function of the foreign parole
board of determining the validity of the
revocation, 94 provided that the viola-
tion itself occurred before the end of
the maximum sentence.
When the parole was obtained by
fraud, the parolee is subject to extra-
dition even though he was granted per-
mission to go to the asylum state. In
People ex rel. Hutchings v. Mallon, 5
the extradition of "Big Hutch," bunco
artist extraordinaire, by Governor Al
Smith was upheld by the New York
Court of Appeals, where it appeared
that a parole had been fraudulently
obtained from the California parole
board by concealing relevant facts as
to Hutch's past activities through con-
nivance of various politicians. The pa-
role gave permission to go to New
91 Hughes v. Pflany, 71 C. C. A. 234, 138 Fed. 980.
92 The New York and Nevada cases. supra n.
80 and 81.
93 Ex parte Carroll, supra, (violation in parol-
ing state); State ex Tel. Cooney v. Hoffmeister.
supra, (in asylum stat'1
94 Reed v. Colpoys, supra where the viola-
tion occurred before the end of the maximum
sentence.
York, but this provision received little
attention from the New York court.
The California governor requested
extradition, attaching his reasons for
revoking the parole, and extradition
was granted. The court gave liberal
construction to the word "flee," abiding
by the Supreme Court's authority in
Appleyard v. Mass.9
The problem of what would happen
if the governor of the asylum state
should refuse extradition at the request
of the governor of the demanding state
arose as early as 1860, when the Su-
preme Court decided that the courts of
the demanding state had no power to
issue mandamus to compel the gov-
ernor of the asylum state to extradite.9 7
The federal extradition statute98 .has
been so construed up to the present.
By analogy, this rule would apply to
the extradition of a paroled convict,
although no cases have arisen on this
issue. The purpose of the Uniform Act
for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision '
is to prevent such a situation from aris-
ing by abolishing the governor's discre-
tion and other extradition formalities.
A troublesome problem which may
often arise is whether a prisoner out
on parole in the paroling state is sub-
ject to extradition for a pending indict-
ment or conviction of another crime in
another state. Carpenter v. Lord00
holds that the paroling state has con-
trol over the parolee- until the end of
his term and should not extradite be-
95 218 App. Div. 461, 218 N. Y. Supp. 432 (1926),
aff'd 245 N. Y. 521,157 N. E. 842 (1927).
,1( See n. 89, supra
97 Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.
98 Rev. Stat. sec. 5278 (1875), 18 U. S. C. sec. 662
(1934). Cf. 67 U. S. L. Rev. 58 (1933); 69 Minn. 104,
72 N. W. 53 (1897).9 9 lnfra, n. 105.
100 88 Oregon 128, 171 Pac. 577 (1918). Cf. L. X.
A. 1918 D, 680.
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fore then. A somewhat analogous situ-
ation occurred in State ex rel. Nichol-
son v. Bush,"" where a felon-parolee
was held to be in the -custody of the
parole board so as to preclude arrest
and confinement in a county jail in the
same state for a misdemeanor of which
he had been convicted simultaneously
with the felony. Where an out-of-state
parolee commits a crime in the-asylum
state, this rule of first jurisdiction-
completion of jurisdiction is rarely ap-
plied. The usual practice is for the
ayslum state to dispose of the new
crime by conviction, sentence, and im-
pris.onment, and then listen to the de-
mands of the paroling state. 1 2 The
argument for this practice is that the
evidence should be used while fresh
and sentence completed in order to
avoid double extradition. The argu-
ment against it is that the parole board
still exercises control over a parolee
even when beyond the state line, and
this jurisdiction should be completed
before action by the second state.
The question of extradition becomes
more complex when three states are
involved: the paroling state, the asylum
state, and the demanding state. In Von
Walden v. Geides,103 the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that a prisoner
paroled by California with permission
to reside in Connecticut could not de-
feat *his extradition to Michigan to
answer a charge of crime committed
there by setting up the defenses that
his parole had three years to run and
that the Michigan authorities knew
o 136 Tenn. 478, 190 S. W. 453 (1916).
102 But see State v. Hoffmeister, supra where
the parolee was extradited to Illinois although
uftder arrest in - Missouri for a misdemeanor
committed there.
os 105 Conn. 374, 135 Atl. 396 (1926).
about his parole and acquiesced there-
in. The court said that the inchoate
right of California to reclaim him
should not serve to secure in Connecti-
cut an asylum from the just demands
of Michigan.
As to extradition between foreign
countries, such right exists only by
virtue of treaty provisions. In U. S. v.
AUison1°  the Canadian court held that
a person-found in Canada who had been
convicted in the United States of an
extraditable crime and subsequently
paroled to Canada, and who had vio-
lated his parole while in Canada, could
be extradited to the United States. The
ground was, not that he had violated
his parole, which is not an extraditable
crime, but that he was a fugitive under
the Canadian Extradition Act, which
defined a fugitive as a "person being
in Canada who is accused or convicted
of an extraditable crime committed
within the jurisdiction of a foreign
state."
What effect has been had on this
problem of extradition of paroled con-
victs by the passage of the Interstate
Crime Commission's Uniform Act for
Out-of-State Probationer and Parolee
Supervision? Since its introduction in
1937, thirty-two states have passed the
enabling act and thirty-four have be-
come signatory to the interstate com-
pact. 0 5 The advantage of this act over
the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act,108 which to date has been enacted
by thirty -states, is that the former
waives all extradition formalities and
104 ... N. S. ... , 42D. L. R:595 (1918).
105 Handbook-on Interstate Crime Control (1940
ed.), Interstate Commission on Crime. Alabama,
which became signatory in October, 1940, has
been included in the figure 34.
108 Sec. 22 treats fugitive parolees.
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enables officers of the paroling state to
enter other signatory states, for the
purpose of retaking a parolee, without
being subjected to the cumbersome and
tedious habeas corpus proceeding. The
only requirement is that the parole
officer be properly identified with duly
authenticated papers. That the act has
been widely used in its some three
years of existence is evidenced by case-
load statistics in the commission's hand-
book, p. 72. As of September, 1938,
the number of out-of-state parolees
under supervision, in accordance with
the provisions of the compact, was 1,691,
with Illinois and New Jersey having
over 300 apiece, mostly from adjacent
states. New York has supplied a con-
siderable caseload to New Jersey, al-
though the former is not a signatory
state.
The constitutional legality of these
interstate compacts on crime is estab-
lished.""7 They were legalized by the
Crime Control Consent Act of 1934
(18 U. S. C. A. 7), which eliminated
the objection of Article I, Section 10,
clause 3 of the Federal Constitution
that "no state shall, without the consent
of Congress, enter into any agreement
or compact with another state."
The case of People ex rel. Pahl v.
Pollack, supra, involving the denial by
a New York court of a request by the
Pennsylvania parole board for extra-
dition of a parolee, could not have
arisen if New York had been a fellow
signatory of Pennsylvania. It is likely
that the body of extradition law as to
out-of-state parolees will entirely dis-
appear as the remaining fifteen or more
107 This constitutional history is set out in the
Handbook, supra p. 73.
states pass the uniform act and sign
the compact. In the meantime, the ef-
fect of the Pollack case may be to dis-
courage parole boards of signatory
states from permitting parolees to go
to non-signatory states.
The only reported case under the
uniform act is that of Martin v. Sulli-
van, which arose in an Iowa inferior
court in January, 1938.'0" Here, Martin
had been paroled from Illinois in 1931
on agreement that he could be returned
without formality whenever he violated
the conditions of his parole. In 1932 he
was convicted of a crime in Iowa and
committed to the Iowa penitentiary.
On his release in December, 1937, he
was arrested by Illinois parole officers.
On a habeas corpus hearing, the Iowa
court delivered him to the Illinois offi-
cers on proof that both Illinois and Iowa
had become signatories to the inter-
state compact by September, 1937.
VII. SUMMARY
Some form of parole system exists in
all of the forty-eight states, and the
federal government. Legal problems
arising out of this situation depend nec-
essarily on the particular statute as
presently existing, so that as a result
no integrated body of law has grown
up. In addition, although parole has
been a penal treatment for over half a
century, the law on the subject is in
its infancy, most of the problems hav-
ing arisen in the last two decades.
The constitutionality of parole stat-
utes has been established, many states
avoiding objections by placing dual
power in the governor and a parole
I s See Handbook, supra p. 77.
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board. With two exceptions, 9 no con-
stitutional issue -has been considered
since the Ughbanks case in 1908.
A prison inmate is not entitled as a
matter of right to a parole even though
he meets the eligibility requirements,
but he may be able to force the parole
board to consider his case. Eligibility
for parole depends entirely on the pa-
role statute, varying from first offenders
under 25, only, to no discrimination ex-
cept service of minimum sentence.
Treason, first degree murder, and life
imprisonment crimes are usually ex-
cluded from parole consideration. Court
review is not available as to the pro-
cedure or the factors considered by the
board in refusing to grant parole.
Any reasonable condition that is not
immoral, illegal, or impossible of per-
formance can be legally attached to a
parole. The only objectionable condi-
tion which is upheld in certain jurisdic-
tions" is that of restricting the parolee
beyond his maximum sentence, al-
though some criminologists might also
object to detailed conditions such as
attending church regularly and refrain-
ing from the use of tobacco.
A convict's civil rights, such as vot-
ing or holding office, are not restored
by parole; on the contrary, a parolee is
like a prison inmate. He is immune
from arrest and imprisonment, except
for an offense committed while on pa-
role, but he is subject to trial for any
crime committed prior or subsequent
to parole.
Ordinarily, a parolee cannot be held
beyond the expiration of his maximum
sentence, although a few "conditional
109 Woods v. Tenn. and People v. Mikula,
supra, n. 9 and 16 J. Crim. L. 40.
x1o This condition is upheld in only a few "con-
pardon" jurisdictions allow this
whether or not the parole instrument
has an express condition to that ef-
fect.11' Most parole statutes specifically
provide that a parolee is entitled to a
hearing before the parole board or com-
missioner if his parole is revoked; some
provide for summary revocation with-
out hearing. Sometimes the parole in-
strument itself makes specific provision.
Where both are silent, a court hearing
is generally held to be the parolee's
right. Since a parole may not be re-
voked except for violation of its condi-
tions, or illegal and unwarranted grant
in the first place, the hearing is on one
of these issues, generally the former.
The hearing accorded by the parole
board is seldom reviewable in court.
However, the reconfined parolee is al-
ways protected by his right to a court
hearing on the issues of confinement
beyond his term, his identity, and the
authority to revoke of the officials who
did revoke.
Whether parole operates to suspend
sentence depends on the particular stat-
ute or judicial decisions. The orthodox
view, followed by a majority of ihe
states and the federal courts, is that
it does not. Whether time served on
parole counts to the credit of the re-
imprisoned parolee also depends on the
particular state statute and decisions.
The orthodox view here seems to be
that, contrary to the federal statute,
time on parole does count for the
prisoner. Where a parolee has been
convicted and sentenced for a crime
committed while on parole, the parole
statute ordinarily provides that the
ditional pardon" states.
3.1 These few states generally have a statute
providing that parole suspends sentence.
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prior unexpired sentence is separate
and shall be served first, or it provides
that the second sentence shall state
whether it is to be served consecutively
or concurrently with the first. In the
absence of express provision, the rule
is that the sentences are concurrent.
As to which of two statutes govern-
ing revocation procedure a parolee is
subject, the sound view is that he is
subject to the statute in force when he
violates his parole.
Ordinarily, in extradition proceed-
ings, the court of the asylum state will
not inquire into the issue of parole vio-
lation, but will grant extradition where
the demand of the paroling state meets
all the formal requirements. A few
courts will, however, investigate the
substantive problem. The Uniform Out-
of-State Parolee Supervision Act, in
force in about thirty-five states, has
eliminated these procedural and sub-
stantive problems by waiving extradi-
tion formalities.
The most urgently needed reform in
the whole field of parole is a pure inde-
terminate sentence law, with no max-
imum or .minimum sentence provision,
and a parole statute incorporating a
prison reformatory system and placing
sole power to grant or revoke parole
and fix conditions in a parole board of
five, seven, or nine men and women, de-
pending on the size of the state, who
will be appointed for good behavior on
a merit basis and will devote their
whole time to parole matters, at an ade-
quate salary. The law and the courts
should steer clear of the parole field,
which is a specialized branch demand-
ing specialized training. Until this
Utopia is attained, hope must be pinned
on a gradual enlightenment of legisla-
tors and a gradual improvement in the
personnel of the judiciary and prison
and parole officialdom. Other matters,
such as closer cooperation between
prison officials, parole officials, and psy-
chiatrists, are better left to the crim-
inologists.
VIII. APPENDIX
Table of Paroling Authorities in the Several
States and the Federal Government
Separate parole board created for that
•purpose alone: (12)
Federal, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia,
Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Washington, Florida (par-
don board-conditional pardon).
Parole board within a governmental de-
partment: (2)
Illinois (Public Safety Department),
Massachusetts (Department of Correc-
tion).
Parole duties added to others already in-
cumbent on a pardon board or board of
prison commissioners: (4)
Arkansas, Califorriia, Maine, Montana.
Separate parole board for each penal insti-
tution consisting of the board of trustees
of that institution: (2)
Connecticut, Florida (only boys' and
girls' industrial schools).
Board of pardons or paroles of which the
governor is one member: (7)
Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah.
Parole power in governor only on recom-
mendation of the parole board, or in
parole board only with approval of
governor: (7)
Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, New Mex-
ico, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin.
Governor alone, with advisory power in a
parole board: (2)
Alabama, Oklahoma.
Governor, with the help of a commis-
sioner: (4)
Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina,
West Virginia.
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Governor alone: (6)
Colorado, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Virginia and Vermont (governor--con-
ditional pardon), Wyoming (parole only
of convicts under twenty-five, 'first
offenders).
Miscellaneous: (4)
Indiana (parole by Board of Public Wel-
fare on recommendation of trustees).
Mississippi (no parole statite, but prob-
ably power in the board of prison com-
missioners to grant restricted release, or
in the governor to grant conditional
pardon).
New Hampshire (governor with advice
of council).
Tennessee (commissioner alone).
Notes on Parole Statutes
Only Mississippi and Virginia are with-
out legislation as to parole, and in Virginia
the governor grants conditional pardon
under the state constitution. Florida and
Vermont, by statute, confuse conditional
pardon and parole, the former placing con-
ditional pardon power in a board-of par-
dons, the latter in the governor. New
Hampshire uses the statutory term "per-
mit" rather than parole. Every other state
has a statute specifically creating a parole
system, eo nomine.
The parole board may be called by
various names, such as board of pardons
and paroles, board of prison terms, prison
commission, clemency commission, and the
like. Personnel, as provided by statute,
ranges from governor to superintendent of
public instruction, from prison warden to
private citizen of good repute, from
supreme court judge to physician, from
secretary of state or attorney-general to
chairman of the public works and high-
way department or president of the board
of agriculture. The number of members
may vary from a commissioner of one to a
board consisting of eight. New Jersey is
unique in having a "Court of Pardons"
composed of the governor, the chancellor,
and the six judges of the Court of Errors
and Appeals, who act only- for the state
prison. The board of managers of every
other penal institution is the parole author-
ity in collaboration with other agencies.
Washington, by 1935 statute, provides for
a maximum sentence law with sole power
in the Board of Prisons, Terms, and Paroles
to set -the definite minimum term and time
for parole. Georgia is alone in its 1938
statutory experiment of creating a Prison
and Parole Commission of three members
to be elected by the people.
The board may be a separate entity
created solely for parole purpose, or it may
be an already existing pardon board, or it
may be part of a governmental department
as in Massachusetts and Illinois. Unan-
imous vote of its members may be neces-
sary, or only a majority. New York has
created, besides its state parole board, a
Parole Commission for First Class Cities,
whose revoking acts are subject to court
review only if the sentence was for more
than three years.
Final discharge from parole is possible,
in more than one-half the states, before the
expiration of the maximum sentence. Some
statutes allow, others forbid application for
parole by the prisoner or his attorney or
friends.
By a bill passed by the Illinois State
Legislature, July 1, 1941, the Parole Board
and its duties have been transferred from
the Department of Public Welfare to a
newly created Department of Public Safe-
ty. The new Parole Board is now called:
"The Divisioi of Correction" and is com-
posed of five members: The Superintendent
of Prisons, Superintendent of Paroles,
Superintendent of Supervision of Parolees,
Superintendent of Crime Prevention; and
the State Criminologist.
